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Policy Brief
The Truth about Moral Hazard
and Adverse Selection
Mark V. Pauly

The Truth about Moral Hazard
and Adverse Selection
This brief is actually going to have two levels. One level will go
with the advertised title, and I’ll tell you my current views on the
truth about moral hazard and adverse selection. Adverse selection
will serve as somewhat of a handmaid of moral hazard, as you
will see. That’s one level.
The other level, though, which continues to surprise me, is that
these two topics—they’re two buzzwords from insurance
theory—have generated an enormous amount of policy interest
and, yes, passion. Some people passionately believe some things
about moral hazard that others passionately disbelieve. And so as
part of this second level I will draw back a bit from the actual
subject matter to ask a kind of positive public policy question:
Why is it that some people can get so passionate about a subject
that seems fairly esoteric?

Moral Hazard
The perfect kind of insurance, to an economist, does one and only
one thing: it transfers money from the lucky to the unlucky.
Since, before the fact, you might be either one, you could say that
it transfers wealth from the lucky state to the unlucky state,
without affecting anything else.
Moral hazard in insurance occurs when the expected
loss from an adverse event increases as insurance
coverage increases.
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When moral hazard is present, insurance does more than just
transfer money from one state to another. When people have
insurance, their behavior changes in such a way that their
expected expense is higher.
Theoretically, if I have health insurance, I’m not going to bother
to wear my sweater like my mother always told me or I’ll catch
my death of cold, because it’s OK, the insurance will pay for my
cold to be treated, and I’ll be my usual devil-may-care self. That
may be what’s happening in health care. But a much more serious
consequence, I think, of the presence of insurance compared to its
absence, or of the presence of more generous insurance compared
to less generous insurance, is that people with more generous
insurance use more medical care, both in quantity and quality,
compared to people with less generous insurance, even when they
experience the same illness.
In a sense, the phenomenon that we’re talking about, according to
my father-in-law, who’s a retired GP, is manifested by what some
of his patients would say to him. They’d say “That’s OK, doc, the
insurance will pay for it.” That’s the sort of behavior that we’ll be
talking about.
The population that I want to focus on, one that is definitely
subject to moral hazard and is also the hot potato in much of the
policy debate, is the typical American, and the typical American
is not covered by public insurance, not poor, and not sickly.
There certainly are low-income people and people at high risk,
but the great bulk of people with health insurance or who are
contemplating having health insurance are not poor or high-risk.
So the rhetorical question here is: Why all the fuss about health
insurance? No one cares about other kinds of insurance, like the
size of the deductible for auto collision coverage. But people do
care about health insurance. That’s the dilemma.
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Cost Sharing

Although various aspects of moral hazard have run through the
health insurance debate over the years, at the moment the debate
du jour involving moral hazard has to do with the so-called health
savings account, or consumer-directed health plan, or, because
those terms are kind of emotive and judgmental, what is called
“high-deductible health insurance.” The primary purpose for
offering high-deductible health insurance is to reduce moral
hazard. I’ll explain why in just a minute.
I have some friends who believe that cost-sharing is evil. It
causes people to underuse medical care, which then ruins their
health because they didn’t use the medical care they should. And
it also causes them to expose themselves to financial ruin.
Therefore, these friends oppose high-deductible health insurance.
There are other people I know who sound just as reasonable
when you talk to them in polite company, who will think of the
same sort of phenomenon and come at it from 180 degrees
opposite. They say that cost sharing is virtuous. It causes people
to be frugal and wise in their use of medical care, and wise as
well in their financial planning. They must have all had fathers
like mine; whenever I had a problem my dad would say “You
should have thought of that beforehand.” High-deductible health
insurance is for that population. These people also tend to favor
tax breaks for high-deductible health plans, along the lines of tax
breaks in current law for health savings accounts and along the
lines of some proposals that are made by, among others,
President George W. Bush, to extend tax breaks to the premium
for high-deductible health plans, as well as to the health savings
accounts.
Both groups of people agree, however, that whatever insurance
people might choose on their own, the government should not
accept that choice but rather should try to change it. The
government should either do something to get people to choose
insurance with lower levels of cost-sharing than they currently
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would choose, if you’re in the first camp, or something to get
them to choose higher levels of cost-sharing if you’re in the
second camp.
The simplest way to summarize my contrasting argument in a
phrase is, I advocate aggressive neutrality. And so my view is
that both views are wrong. For this population (non-poor, nonsickly) there is an optimal level of cost-sharing, which involves
neither free care nor enormous deductibles. This is the level, as
I’ll explain a little more in detail in a moment, that would lead to
an appropriate level of health and financial protection, balancing
incentives to use care with incentives to provide financial
protection.
The view that people should be encouraged to have plans with
high deductibles and high out-of-pocket payments I find
questionable, because that may lead to a level of out-of-pocket
payment in excess of the amount that people ought to
appropriately choose. I also find arguments for very low levels of
cost sharing, which will increase spending, to be questionable.
My view is that the level of cost-sharing that this population of
ordinary middle class people would choose, in the absence of
either kind of government intervention—either a kind that
encourages or discourages subsidies or taxes or regulation—is
probably pretty close to the ideal level.
For lower-income people or people at high risk I come to quite a
different conclusion. We want to provide more insurance to lowincome and high-risk people than they might choose on their
own, in order to actually create moral hazard to get them to use
additional medical care. But for the bulk of the population, the
general proposition that I want to argue is that incentives should
be neutral, neither slanting the table toward high levels of costsharing nor low levels of cost-sharing, basically letting people
choose, given their own tastes, about how they would make
various tradeoffs.
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The Problem of Imperfect Information
Why is health insurance so complicated? Anything in real life is
complicated, once you get into it, but there is at least a theoretical
idea of how to offer insurance that wouldn’t have problems of
either moral hazard or adverse selection. The problem is that the
theoretical ideal isn’t practical this side of heaven.
The theoretical ideal would be the following sort of insurance
market:
•
Imagine that consumers in general are knowledgeable
about the marginal benefits from health care. They might spend
all their time surfing on WebMD, and that’s why they know it. Or
somewhat more practically, they might have kindly and
unstressed primary care physicians who are able to explain to
them the benefits and costs and risks of various levels of health
care consumption.
•
And imagine as well that insurers know everything about
you and, when you get sick, know how sick you are. So the
insurer knows how bad your backache is, how frequent your
urination is, how much it really itches, and therefore can
determine and define a state of health.
The theoretically perfect insurance would take the following
form: the insurance that I would get would say, Mark, if you have
a really bad back, here’s a check for $20,000. If it’s just creaking
a bit here’s a check for $500, and if it’s really just because you
did too much work in the garden over the weekend, here’s a
check for $2, enough to buy a small bottle of Excedrin. Coverage
would take the form of indemnities. The person would decide
beforehand how much medical care in each state of health
represents the amount at which the benefit is greater than the
cost. What’s the quantity at which the marginal benefit just
equals the cost? That’s the amount of medical care I want to
have, recognizing that if I consume more than that, I will have to
pay for it in higher premiums. So I would prefer an insurance
policy that gave me a check that would, in each illness state,
5
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purchase just the amount of medical care that is economically
efficient for me to have, and—remember I’m fully informed—the
amount up to the point where marginal benefit just equals
marginal cost. In that case there wouldn’t be any moral hazard,
because, whether I have insurance or not, setting aside some
small income effects, I would consume the same amount of care.
I would not buy units of medical care beyond the amount of the
check if I would have to pay for them 100% myself.

Adverse Selection
Adverse selection is the tendency for people with
higher-risk (health expectations) to obtain insurance
coverage to a greater extent than persons with lesser-risk
(health expectations), because insurers are unable to tell
who’s high-risk and who’s low-risk.
When private insurers try to offer policies charging premiums
that will cover all their costs, the rate for those high-risk people
may be inadequate. In particular, the people who are high-risk,
known to themselves but unbeknownst to the insurer, show up
and say “I want the most generous policy you’ve got.” Whereas
the people who are low-risk, especially if they wait a while to see
how much the premium increases because all of those high-risk
people got there before them, will say “If I want any insurance at
all, I want it to be very minimal and very frugal, not because I
don’t like insurance and not because I’m not interested in
protecting myself from risk, but rather because it’s so much more
expensive in premium relative to what I would expect to get
back.”
Its connection to moral hazard is this: the opponents of high
cost-sharing are worried not only that high cost-sharing plans
may cause people to underuse medical care, but also because the
high cost-sharing plans may draw off from the risk pool the
people who otherwise would have been low-risk and leave in the
risk pool only the high-risk people. So although there are a lot of
reasons to worry about adverse selection, the primary reason to
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worry about it in this brief is because of its impact on the demand
for high-deductible insurance or other types of limited coverage.
Perfect knowledge also solves the adverse selection problem.
Imagine that insurers can also tell by looking at you what your
risk level is. Imagine by looking at you or hooking you up to the
appropriate piece of equipment insurers could tell what risk level
you are. Then insurers could offer low premiums to the low-risks
and high premiums to the high-risks. The proposition in
economics is they would all be willing to buy insurance as long
as the administrative cost was not too high. The alternative to
paying somewhat more for insurance, if you’re at somewhat high
risk, is not paying nothing, it is having to face the same
distribution as out-of-pocket expenses, which is a terrible thing to
have happen. So you’d prefer insurance.
The sweeping generalization here is, if insurers were omniscient
and people were knowledgeable, everybody would have just that
kind of insurance that induces them to use care to the point where
benefits are greater than costs. Out-of-pocket costs would be
close to zero, because no one would spend much more than the
indemnity amount. That would be the best of all possible worlds,
at least as far as the economist is concerned, for the non-poor
non-sickly.
For people who are low-income, or high-risk, just to elaborate a
bit more on the subtext here, there is a kind of altruistic
externality motivation, which is economist jargon for the good
Samaritan, the feeling that when we see suffering by our fellow
human beings we feel predisposed to do something to alleviate it,
at least up to a point. That’s why we want to have additional
insurance coverage for low-income and high-risk people. But for
those of us who are relatively well off and relatively healthy, my
argument would be that there probably is not much altruistic
concern about underuse of care. The average American may
underuse some kinds of care and overuse others but, on average,
he or she probably uses enough care.
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The Optimal Level of Cost Sharing
What is the primary motivation to buy insurance? In economics it
is to protect yourself from financial risk. Otherwise, if the bad
thing happens and I get unlucky, there’s a big hit to my
checkbook. And when it comes to health care that hit can be big
and is getting bigger every day. The fundamental reason to have
health insurance, at least from the economic viewpoint, is to
protected yourself from financial risk. Moral hazard means that
the consequence of protecting yourself against financial risk is to
stimulate the use of additional medical care, which by definition
is medical care that is not worth what it costs, because if it was
worth what it cost you would have bought it even if you didn’t
have insurance. That’s the dilemma—that insurance, by
disguising the price, makes expensive things look cheap.
The way to describe the optimal extent of cost-sharing in this
kind of world is to think of the following choice calculus:
•
Imagine you start with no insurance. For the first 1% of
coverage, the benefit is great in terms of risk protection, because
otherwise you might have a five-figure hospital bill, and at least
you’ll get 1% of it covered by insurance. In economic theory, that
may predispose you to use a little bit more medical care if you’re
paying $.99 on the dollar than if you’re paying $1.00 on the
dollar, but the difference in value between that additional care
and its cost is quite small. So you go for the first 1%.
•
At the other end of the spectrum, you’ve got 99%
coverage and you’re thinking of adding the last 1%. That 1%
coverage is hardly protecting your financial risk because you’ve
got virtually complete coverage to begin with. On the other hand,
if it induces you and your physician to agree on some additional,
more intensive treatment, that unit of care will only be worth $.01
on the dollar. That’s what economists call a welfare cost.
•
Optimal cost-sharing is finding a happy medium, the level
of cost sharing between 1% and 99%, where the additional risk
protection is just balanced against the additional stimulus to use
8
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care whose benefit-to-cost ratio is less than one. That level of
cost sharing would be optimum.
There are two comments I would make about this level of costsharing that I think may be relevant to the policy debate. One is
to point out that in this particular story that I’m telling, the health
care that you give up because of cost-sharing isn’t useless. The
reason it’s not useless is because you’re a well-informed
consumer and you wouldn’t have used useless care in any case.
Instead, you’re induced to give up care that is worth something to
you, but not as valuable as the cost that you’re going to save.
Cost-sharing saves more money than it hurts health, but it does
hurt health. What you seek is a happy balance, a happy medium.
There’s also a tradeoff between risk protection and expected cost.
The addition of beneficial but not cost-beneficial care under
moral hazard for this population of high-income non-sickly
people is not to be praised, and the loss of care is not to be
decried. Having said all that, though, when I go home and talk to
my family, I do feel a little uncomfortable saying “Yeah, it’s
actually a good thing for people to go without beneficial medical
care, because it costs too much money.” But the health sacrificed
under cost-sharing in theory should be small relative to the cost
reduction.

Empirical Research
There has been research, some very old and some quite new, to
find out empirically what happens when people have more or less
generous health insurance or, in one case, when they have health
insurance compared to no health insurance.
The RAND Health Insurance Experiment

The mother lode of information on empirical estimates of moral
hazard is a 15-year-long study that was begun in 1971 by the
RAND Corporation with funding from the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare (now the Department of Health
and Human Services). The Health Insurance Experiment (HIE)
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was a study to determine the impact of health insurance on health
care spending and health outcomes using as close as social
scientists could get to a randomized controlled trial. The HIE
involved approximately 2,000 non-elderly families from six
different areas of the United States, which were assigned to one
of 14 fee-for-service insurance plans with various
(a) coinsurance, or cost-sharing, rates and (b) maximum dollar
expenditures (MDE), or cap on out-of-pocket expenditures, for
medical care services (Newhouse and the Insurance Experiment
Group 1993). There was free care at one extreme, because one
purpose of the HIE was to estimate expenditures under full and
free national health insurance, which everybody was sure was
just around the corner. At the other extreme was an insurance
policy with 95% cost-sharing up to about 10% of a family’s
income (catastrophic coverage). The sample was largely middle
class. Families in that group got a nickel when they sent their
bills to the insurance company, which was mostly to compensate
them for bothering to submit their bills so that researchers could
track their health care expenditures. There were also intermediate
levels of cost-sharing, 50% and 25%. (There was also a fifteenth
plan called the individual deductible which I’m not going to talk
about.)
Table 1. Annual Use of Medical Services per Capita, by Plan
Likelihood
Outpatient
One or More
Face-toof Any Use Expenditures
Admissions
(%)
(1991 $)
(%)
Face Visits
Plan
Free
86.8
$446
4.55
10.3
25%
78.7
341
3.33
8.4
50%
77.2
294
3.03
7.2
95%
67.7
266
2.73
7.9
Individual
72.3
$308
3.02
9.6
Deductible
Source: Newhouse et al. 1993, Table 3.2, p. 41.

Total
Expenditures
(1991 $)
$982
831
884
679
$797

Table 1 summarizes the impact of different amounts of costsharing on the use of medical care. In the last column, the people
with 95% cost-sharing spent about $700 per year on average, in
1991 dollars, or about $1,200 in current dollars, while the people
with free care spent about $1,000 per year (about $1,600 in
current dollars). An increase of somewhere between 30% and
10
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40% in medical care spending was associated with free insurance.
As you can see, there was one exception at the 50% level, but
basically there was a graduated effect. Cost-sharing clearly does
cause people to be more frugal.
The HIE also put enormous effort into documenting the impact of
these lower levels of use of medical care on health outcomes.
They concluded that for the bulk of the population in the
experiment—the 94% who were not low-income and high-risk—
there was little or no measurable effect on health outcome for any
of the cost-sharing plans compared to free care, except that
people with free care kept their eyeglasses up-to-date and their
oral health was a bit better. But that was about it.
However, for low-income people initially at high risk, especially
at high risk for high blood pressure, there was definitely an
adverse effect of cost-sharing on health outcomes. The
economists who were part of the HIE would say that the adverse
effect could have been prevented by targeted screening without
making care free for everybody for everything. The opponents of
high-deductible health plans will say, and it is true, that the HIE
found that people who paid cost-sharing were more likely to
forego effective medical care. But the basic message that I take
away from the HIE is that for the relatively low-risk there does
not appear to be a drastically adverse impact of reduced use of
medical care, as a result of cost-sharing, on health outcomes.
ER Visits by Plan

One part of the HIE looked at the impact of cost-sharing versus
free care on overall visits to emergency rooms, and ER visits by
diagnosis. The diagnoses were categorized as more urgent and
less urgent by a panel of emergency room department physicians.
The HIE found that ER use related to the more urgent diagnoses
was 23% lower on any of the cost-sharing plans than on the free
plan, and the number of ER visits continued to decline as the
level of cost-sharing increased. However, ER use involving the
less urgent diagnoses was 47% lower on the cost-sharing plans
11
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than the free plan, and most of the observed response occurred
between free care and the 25% cost-sharing plan. This says that
when people have to pay a lot out-of-pocket they are much less
likely to make use of the emergency room for conditions which
were labeled by the authors as less urgent, but still nearly as
likely to make use of the emergency room for those more urgent
conditions. That’s the good news.
Table 2. Response to Plans, by Diagnosisa
Annual ER Visits per 10,000 Persons
Cost-Sharing Plans (25%,
50%, 95%, Individual
Diagnosis
Deductible)
Free Plan
More urgent diagnoses
Fracture/dislocation
134
168
Miscellaneous serious
57
67
traumab
Asthma
30
83
Otitis media
40
78
Chest pain/acute heart
59
57
disease
Cellulitis/abscess/wound
36
39
infection
Surgical abdominal
42
38
diseasec
Head injury
36
33
Urinary tract infection
22
43
Acute eye injury/infection
34
34
Obstetrical
29
31
Allergic reaction
26
26
Acute alcohol/drug
27
20
related
Burn, second
19
22
degree/complicated
Visits with any of the
991
1280
above diagnoses
Less urgent diagnoses
Abrasion/contusion
228
403
Sprain
164
249
Upper respiratory
92
190
infection
Influenza/viral syndrome
40
61
Gastroenteritis/diarrhea
36
67
Abdominal pain (no other
34
65
diagnosis)
Back/neck pain
32
67
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Visits on CostSharing Plans as a
Proportion of Visits
on Free Plan
0.80
0.85
0.36
0.51
1.04
0.92
1.11
1.09
0.51
1.01
0.94
1.00
1.35
0.86
0.77d
0.54
0.63
0.51
0.65
0.62
0.53
0.45
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Arthritis/bursitis
30
63
0.45
Headache
8
59
0.11
Acute bronchitis
14
36
0.42
Burn, first degree
7
28
0.28
Visits involving only the
663
1185
0.53d
above diagnoses
Notes:
a. Equal partial weights were used to count visits involving multiple diagnoses. For example, if a
visit resulted in three diagnoses, each diagnosis was credited with one-third of a visit.
b. Includes foreign bodies, ingestions, ligamentous ruptures, and internal, neurovascular, and
crush injuries.
c. Includes cholecystitis, gastrointestinal bleeding, appendicitis, intestinal obstruction, and peptic
ulcer disease.
d. p < 0.01 for the difference between cost-sharing plans and the free plan, and for the
difference between visits involving more urgent diagnoses and visits involving only less urgent
diagnoses.
Source: Newhouse et al. 1993, table 5.3, pp. 155-156.

Ambulatory Care (Office) Visits by Plan

The potentially bad news, though, is in Table 3. Physicians who
were part of the HIE team grouped several health conditions into
four categories by the effectiveness of the medical care with
which they could be treated (in the 1970s): highly effective, quite
effective, less effective, and rarely effective or self-care effective.
This table reports the rate of use of medical care in normal office
practice, by medical effectiveness and insurance plan.
Table 3. Predicted Percentages of Adults and Children with an Episode of Care, by Medical Effectiveness
Categories and Plan
Medical Care
Adults (N=3,543)
Children (N=1,830)
Effectiveness
Cost
Cost Sharing
Cost Sharing
Category
Free
Free
Cost Sharing as % of Free
Sharing
as % of Free
Highly Effective
Acute
28.4
19.0
67a
32.0
23.1
72a
a
Acute/Chronic
16.8
13.3
79
19.4
16.1
83
Chronic
12.6
10.7
85
4.7
2.4
52a
Quite Effective
23.2
17.6
76a
22.4
17.6
79a
Less Effective
25.0
18.6
74a
12.9
9.7
76
Rarely Effective
10.5
7.4
70a
5.1
3.4
67
Rarely Effective
but Self-Care
Effective
35.6
23.9
67a
38.8
29.2
75a
Notes:
a. Effect of cost sharing significant at p < 0.05.
Source: Newhouse et al. 1993, table 5.10, p. 166.
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If we take just the rarely effective and self-care effective
category, there’s a 25% percent reduction in use for adults and
33% reduction in children between the free and cost-sharing
plans. If you agree with the HIE physicians that the care is indeed
rarely effective or that self-care would be effective, this reduction
in use might not worry you much (see Newhouse et al. 1993,
Table 5.7 for the conditions within each category). But the impact
of cost-sharing on use was roughly the same proportion for care
that was categorized as highly effective. So it is literally true that
cost-sharing caused a reduction in the use of highly effective
care.
Insurance vs. No Insurance (Pauly 2005)

Taking this analysis one step further, we looked at the effect of
the presence or complete absence of insurance coverage on
medical care spending and health outcomes for non-poor young
women ages 21 to 40, using data from the 1996 Medical
Expenditure Panel Survey. There are two sets of dependent
variables. One measures the amount of care used, in terms of
money spent on health care and visits to physicians’ offices or
hospital outpatient departments. The second measures health
status or health outcomes, in terms of whether the person’s selfreported health status was fair or poor, and the number of chronic
conditions. We also used the person’s response to a question of
whether she went without care that was needed for health.
Table 4. Regression Coefficients on Insurance Coverage, for Various Dependent
Variables
Going
without
Health
Log Total
Outpatient
Chronic
Fair or
Needed
Estimate
Spending
Visits
Condition
Care
Poor
OLSa
4.48b
2.43b
-0.75b
0.05
0.21
c
b
IV
10.4
3.52
-5.94b
2.05
-0.76
Notes:
a. Single-equation or ordinary least-squares estimates.
b. Statistically significant at 0.05.
c. Instrumental-variables estimates.
Source: Pauly 2005.
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This study, I must say, didn’t turn out the way I had hoped, but
maybe it turned out the way I expected. Table 4 shows that for
both the use of medical care and total spending, the people with
insurance had substantially more total spending and outpatient
visits than the people without insurance. The people with
insurance were also much less likely to report going without
needed care. However, we couldn’t find any connection,
statistically speaking, between having or not having insurance
and self-reported health status or the presence of chronic
conditions.

Does Insurance-affected Care Matter?
If people with cost-sharing forego effective care, at least some of
the time, why is there no appreciable measured impact on their
health outcomes, in either the RAND study or my study?
Let me start with the least likely answer and work my way up.
The explanation actually offered, somewhat tongue in cheek but
perhaps not, by some of the medical researchers on the RAND
project, was that unnecessary care may harm health: something
like “Maybe that care that you were induced to use because it was
free had adverse side effects which harmed your health enough to
wipe out the beneficial effects that you got from the essential care
that you were induced to use.” It would be a sad story about
American medicine, but it could be true.
A second possibility, which is even more esoteric, is that within
the medical care effectiveness categorizations, assuming that they
have legitimacy—and I think they do, at least they were vetted by
a lot of physicians and public health specialists—care with high
average effectiveness may also display a large range of low
marginal benefits. Then, too, perhaps the clinical judgments are
flawed.
Here are two possible explanations that I’m betting on most at the
moment.

15
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•
Imagine that consumers actually don’t really have good
information at all. They know that medical care is good, but they
guess that the average benefit from a dollar spent on medical care
is the same regardless of the kind of care. They would still
choose to use less medical care with cost-sharing than without,
because eventually they would prefer to save their income to pay
for other consumption, as opposed to spending it on medical care.
But that might explain why they reduce care proportionately
across the board; they don’t know what’s high-benefit and what’s
low-benefit.
•
The health measures are insensitive. In fact, studies that
have been done of some of the greatest and most effective
medical interventions—like using statins to reduce high
cholesterol and beta blockers to reduce high blood pressure—can
show statistically significant impacts on deaths from those
particular diseases. But if we look at the overall health level of
the people who got the statins or the beta blocker, do they live
longer in general? The answer oftentimes is no. Sometimes this is
because of competing risks; if you don’t get your heart attack you
may die on your motorcycle. And sometimes it may just be noise
in the data.

My Current Views
On Moral Hazard and Cost Sharing

•
Cost sharing does cause a reduction in the quantity and
quality of care that would be mildly beneficial to middle-class
people of average health. It saves enough to make this a desirable
tradeoff.
•
The current tax subsidy for health insurance premiums
pushes this tradeoff in the direction of inefficiency (second best)
by encouraging excess insurance coverage with excess moral
hazard.
The best strategy that I see for government to take in helping
people choose their health insurance is to be aggressively neutral,
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to basically say to people: “Perhaps we want to encourage you
and to give you a small tax break, for catastrophic coverage,
because in the RAND experiment everybody had catastrophic
coverage. But beyond catastrophic coverage we will not change
your taxes or regulations to try to push you one way or another.
It’s up to you, person, to decide how you want to make this
tradeoff between risk protection and additional medical care use.”
Personally, I’d probably go for the low cost-sharing plan, because
my view is life’s too short to spend all your time worrying about
economizing on medical care. But if somebody wanted to choose
a high-deductible health plan, I’d be willing to let them do it.
The logical thing to do if you could get sufficient data would be
to use cost-sharing to encourage people to use medical care that
does in truth have high marginal benefit, and discourage care
with low marginal benefit. You could design health insurance
policies with what’s called benefits-based cost-sharing: lower
cost-sharing for the highly effectively things that consumers seem
to underuse, like the beta blockers, and raise cost-sharing for the
things that consumers seem to overuse. And try to encourage
people to move in the right direction.
No one has ever argued that moral hazard is a reason why
someone should remain totally uninsured. We should have
catastrophic coverage for all. Low-income people should not be
subject to cost sharing in general. Beyond that, moral hazard is a
phenomenon to be managed, and it should be managed well by
competitive insurers offering a range of plans to consumers, in a
neutral way.
On Adverse Selection

Adverse selection is caused by imperfect insurer information
about risk. From an economic perspective, the efficient structure
is perfect risk rating. But policy makers do not like risk rating:
they seek “markets” in which everyone buys generous insurance,
even though the premium is uniform, e.g., community rating.
Most of us in our normal lives would like insurance that’s what
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you might call a reverse Lake Woebegone, where everybody pays
less than average for their insurance. But we know that’s not
possible. Here in New York State I talk about community rating
with some trepidation, but the basic message from economic
theory is that the best strategy, the way to get as many people as
possible to buy health insurance, is to have premiums tailored to
people’s risk level. Then, the low-risks would buy. Even the 23year-old immortals would buy, if we got health insurance
premiums for them down close to the level of their expected
expense, although we might need to run a series of commercials,
“This is your brain without health insurance,” to persuade them.
But the middle class high-risks would still buy insurance because
it’s better to have insurance than to be uninsured if you should
get sick.
We do have some examples of adverse selection in health
insurance, but the great bulk of them have occurred when the
market was interfered with, and where adverse selection arose not
from some decentralized competitive world but rather from
tampering with what would otherwise be the operation of
competitive markets.
Exhibit A for that kind of market tampering, Medigap coverage
for prescription drugs, is out of date now, thank goodness. The
calculations around that kind of insurance went something like
this. The typical policy would cover prescription drugs up to a
maximum payment of $1,100 a year. The premium that Medigap
insurers had to charge to break even was over $900. So that tells
you that almost everybody who bought that insurance used the
whole $1,100, which is not the average drug expense for a person
over age 65. Clearly, people who were likely to use drugs could
and did buy that insurance, because Medigap did not permit the
insurer to charge a higher premium to people who were already
using more expensive medicines than average. Medigap was
trying to be nice to those high-risk people, but it ended up not
being all that helpful because it was charging them almost as
much as they were going to get in benefits. And the low-risk
people dropped out entirely.
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That’s the rationale for a politically incorrect statement: that
community rating is a foolish and inefficient way to subsidize
lower income high-risks. I do believe there are reasons why we
might want to subsidize them, but we should use general taxes to
raise money for subsidies to high-risks and then make transfers to
them.
There are some interesting ways to limit adverse selection. I’ll
just talk about three of them here.
1. The most obvious one would be risk rating based on good
information. It turns out that other circumstances in which we
have seen adverse selection have been in private sector settings
where, for some reason, health economists usually study
university health insurance plans, and when universities
incorrectly set the premium differential between the highgenerosity plan and the high-deductible plan, everybody left the
generous plan and went to the high-deductible plan, or at least a
lot of people did. Or in some cases the calculations were just
anticipating that this would occur, and being very upset about the
prospect.
A well-managed benefits department with good actuarial and
statistical consultation can figure out how to set the premium
differential for the low-cost high-deductible plan to make sure
that it’s not inefficiently attractive to high-risks. One way to keep
high-deductible health plans from totally wiping out the risk pool
in employment-based group insurance is to make sure that you
set the reward for joining the high-deductible plan at a level
appropriate to the risk level of the people who are choosing it, not
the average risk difference. That will get choices to be made
more efficiently (though not perfectly).
2. There is a provision in individual insurance called guaranteed
renewability at class average premiums. If you buy individual
insurance in most states, in effect your premium has two parts.
One part of your premium will pay your expenses for next year.
But because the insurer has promised if you renew they will sell
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you coverage at the same premium as they’re charging everybody
else, the insurer charges an extra premium to collect enough
money from you to cover the difference between the premium if
you become a high-risk and the lower premium that they would
charge you in the future. This is a market solution to deal with
what I think is the main reason why we are really worried about
adverse selection: the fear that “What if I became a high-risk
unexpectedly and not entirely by my own fault?” Risk averse
people want to avoid risk reclassification. Guaranteed
renewability can prevent that. If you have bought a policy with
guaranteed renewability then there is no way for an insurer to
come in and pick you off if you’re a low risk, no way for adverse
selection to occur. And if you’re a high risk, there’s no reason to
try to buy a more generous policy because you’ve got the best
possible policy you can have.
Is there evidence of large scale adverse selection in competitive
health insurance markets? Cardon and Hendel (2001), using data
on single employed individuals (18 to 65 years old) from the
National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), said no. So I
don’t lie awake nights, worrying about adverse selection for the
bulk of the population. I do worry about those low-income highrisk people.

Conclusions
•
Given such imperfect information as we have, we should
use cost-sharing carefully but bravely.
•
Control of moral hazard for the average person is unlikely
to be harmful if coverage is chosen based on neutral tax
incentives.
•
If tax incentives are distorted, and either encourage or
discourage cost-sharing, it’s likely to be harmful.
•
Adverse selection can be tamed in most settings, though it
probably cannot be totally prevented. Direct subsidies to
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coverage for low-income high-risk people is better than premium
regulation.
•
And low-income high-risk people do need generous
coverage, but the rest of us should only have it if we’re willing to
pay its true cost.
Proposals for the Political Debate

There is an inevitable temptation for policy makers to not only
review insurance policies but to decide what kind of insurance
policy they think makes sense, and then slant subsidies in favor
of that policy. We need to tell the people in Congress, “You
weren’t elected to be a cheerleader or an insurance salesman.
You were elected to offer efficient incentives to your constituents
to choose what makes sense.” I certainly don’t want any
Republican designing my health insurance, much less a
Democrat. So the basic message here would be to try to be
neutral. Here’s my proposal for the political debate.
We should agree that neither better health nor cost-containment is
unmitigatedly good. We need the right mix. I know this is
economics talking, but I’m programmed to say it. And no one
knows what that right mix is, in part because we don’t know how
insurance affects health.
I think we should agree on the distribution of total taxes first and
then decide what the rich should pay, and how much help the
poor and the non-poor should get.
We should take encouraging increased cost-sharing for lowerincome people off the table. My biggest fear about highdeductible health plans and health savings accounts is that a few
low-income people might be induced to choose them. I guess I’d
rather have them have a high-deductible plan than no insurance at
all, but that certainly wouldn’t be my most preferred plan for a
low-income person.
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Rather than have high-deductible health plans tax-subsidized, I
would instead limit the tax incentive that’s offered to highincome people to induce them to choose plans with low levels of
cost-sharing, which would go along with the cap.
And finally, for the lower-income or high-risk people:
•
We should subsidize generous coverage with a
predetermined tax credit of an amount large enough to make
choosing the right policy a reasonable choice.
•
Regulate those qualified policies lightly, at least in the
beginning, because we want to make sure people get some
insurance, and as we know from the RAND experiment, even a
relatively high cost-sharing plan can yield as high a level of
health outcome as a more generous one.
•
Consider denying tax breaks for high-deductible health
plans to lower-income people so they aren’t tempted.
•
Make sure there’s a much better alternative for lowincome high-risk people, and be passionate about that.
It’s important to focus passion, I guess, for cost-effective
deployment of passion. For a health economist that would be the
best of all possible worlds.
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